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Abstract
The motivating role of linear logic is as a “logic behind logic”. We propose a sibling role
for it as a logic of transformational mathematics via the self-dual category of Chu spaces, a
generalization of topological spaces. These create a bridge between linear logic and mathematics
by soundly and fully completely interpreting linear logic while fully and concretely embedding
a comprehensive range of concrete categories of mathematics. Our main goal is to treat each
end of this bridge in expository detail. In addition, we introduce the dialectic lambda-calculus,
and show that dinaturality semantics is not fully complete for the Chu interpretation of linear
logic. c© 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Linear logic was introduced by J.-Y. Girard as a “logic behind logic”. It separates
logical reasoning into a core linear part in which formulas are merely moved around,
and an auxiliary nonlinear part in which formulas may be deleted and copied. The
core, multiplicative linear logic (MLL), is a substructural logic whose basic connec-
tives are linear negation A⊥, and linear conjunction or “tensor” A⊗B with unit 1.
MLL’s axiomatization resembles relevance logic in lacking weakening, from B de-
rive AB, but di=ers from it in also lacking contraction, from A; AB derive AB.
MLL obeys A⊥⊥∼=A, associativity and commutativity of tensor, and linear distribu-
tivity, the transformability of positive occurrences of (A(B)⊗C into A( (B⊗C),
where linear implication A(B abbreviates (A⊗B⊥)⊥. The auxiliary part adds the op-
erations of ordinary product “with” A&B (synonymous with A×B) with unit  and
obeying (A(B)& (A(C)∼=A( (B&C), and exponential !A serving to retract linear
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logic to intuitionistic logic via (inter alia) !(A&B)∼= !A⊗ !B and !∼=1, licensing the
derivation of !AB from either B or !A; !AB.
The question arises as to the denotational semantics of linear logic: what is it about?
Is it only an analytical tool of proof theory, or can it be understood as the logic of
some foundationally signiJcant domain in the same sense that Jrst order logic is the
logic of relational structures, and modal logic that of Kripke structures?
Girard has considered various semantics for linear logic: phase semantics and coher-
ent spaces [17], Hilbert spaces, and more recently Banach spaces. Phase semantics has
truth-valued entailment and resembles Birkho= and von Neumann’s quantum logic [7],
while the other three have the set-valued entailment characteristic of categorical logic:
AB as the set of morphisms from A to B.
A number of other models have also been proposed. Inspired by Blass [8], Abramsky
and Jagadeesan [2] have interpreted linear logic over sequential games, further studied
by Hyland and Ong [20]. Barr has proposed fuzzy relations as a model [6], while Blute
[9] has taken Hopf algebras as an interpretation of noncommutative linear logic.
Chu spaces, the model we treat here, were Jrst proposed by Barr [5] and Lafont
and Streicher [21]. Generalizing an idea of Mackey [23], Barr deJned general V -
enriched Chu spaces, whose carrier, cocarrier, and alphabet k are objects of a symmetric
monoidal closed category V , forming the category Chu(V; k) studied by Barr’s student
Chu [4, Appendix]. Lafont and Streicher treated ordinary Chu spaces, the case V =Set,
under the rubric of games.
None of the above models, Chu spaces included, would appear to have been proposed
with the goal in mind of foundational generality of the kind associated with relational
structures in their role as the standard model of Jrst order logic. Rather their intended
purpose seems to be as “occasional models”: each is presumed to have some intrinsic
interest in its own right, and the main concerns revolve around the quality of the model
as a denotational semantics for linear logic: how closely it matches the structure of LL
proofs.
Furthermore, none of them stands out as the standard model of linear logic. Coher-
ent spaces have the distinction that Girard based his original axiomatization on their
structure, and in that sense coherent spaces can be said to be the motivating model for
linear logic. But that motivation would appear to be insight into proof theory rather
than any independent foundational role for coherent spaces.
So the interest to date in denotational semantics of linear logic appears to be
entirely as an analytical tool of proof theory. In this role it can serve for exam-
ple to expose patterns in the operational or computational behavior of the rules of
linear logic that are not obvious from direct consideration of that behavior. Indeed
there has been considerable interest in the computational implications of linear logic,
particularly for concurrency, and it is a good question to what extent the
proof theoretic and computational aspects of linear logic can be separated, both being
operational.
It is our thesis that the denotational semantics of linear logic in fact serves two dual
purposes. On the one hand, in its role as an analytical tool of proof theory it expresses
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aspects of structure in mathematical proofs and computations. On the other, in the
role we propose for it here, it expresses the transformational structure of universal
mathematics, extending higher order categorical logic [22] from its previous narrow
preoccupation with cartesian closed categories, where it has the form of intuitionistic
logic, to the broader universe of “the rest of mathematics”, where it takes on the shape
of linear logic.
That this is an extension is testiJed to by the operator !A. As normally understood
on the operational side !A liberates the formula A to permit weakening and contraction.
On the denotational side however the ! operation serves to retract the larger universe
of mathematics to a smaller cartesian closed subuniverse constituting the domain of
intuitionistic logic. From this perspective intuitionistic logic is the logic of set- and
poset-like structures, whereas linear logic is that of the larger class of all structures,
ranging from the extreme discreteness of sets to the extreme coherence of complete
atomic Boolean algebras [29].
These two roles, proof theory and transformational mathematics, are not necessarily
best served by the same denotational semantics. In particular, Girard has argued the
need for a denotational semantics of linear logic suQciently concrete as to reRect the
cut-elimination process itself [18, Section III]. Categorical logic as an abstraction of
transformational mathematics on the other hand does not need this much detail at least
in its basic form and is therefore better served by the more abstract cut-free semantics
implicit in our choice of axiom systems for linear logic, and in the modeling of cut-free
proofs by dinatural transformations.
The rest of this paper is laid out in three sections, introducing Chu spaces and treating
each end of the bridge created by Chu spaces between linear logic and mathematics.
Section 2 gives an overview of Chu spaces, treating their intrinsic properties, their
morphisms, and those operations on them relevant to linear logic.
Section 3 considers semantics for which soundness and completeness of linear logic,
understood as a categorical logic, may be judged for the category of functors on
Chu(Set; ). The papers of Barr and Lafont and Streicher cited above have described
the objects of that category, namely the functors interpreting the terms of linear logic.
However they have not mentioned the morphisms between those functors, needed to
interpret the proofs between terms that make the system a categorical logic.
Morphisms between functors are usually taken to be natural transformations. How-
ever linear logic contains functors of mixed variance 2 such as A(A, for which mere
naturality is not enough. Elsewhere [30] we have shown that when the morphisms are
taken to be ordinary dinatural transformations, as done by Blute and Scott [10, 11]
for their Lauchli semantics of linear logic, then Girard’s MIX-free axiomatization of
multiplicative linear logic is sound and fully complete for the fragment admitting at
most two occurrences of each atom. In Section 3 we show that this result cannot be
extended to four occurrences. This is not surprising in the light of the limitations of
2 One might call these sesquifunctors by analogy with sesquilinear functions.
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ordinary dinaturality in other settings such as higher order intuitionistic logic, where a
strengthening of dinaturality is required for full completeness, e.g. logical transforma-
tions as deJned in terms of certain kinds of logical relations [26]. We have recently
showed, with Devarajan et al. [16], that strengthening dinaturality to binary logicality
rescues this situation for Chu spaces. Contrasting with this situation, Tan has shown
[32] that MLL with MIX is fully complete for dinatural transformations in Girard’s
∗-autonomous category Coh of coherence spaces.
We also introduce in this section the dialectic -calculus, as a novel way of
introducing duality into the simply-typed -calculus, namely by supplementing the usual
notion a :A of evidence a for proposition A with x··A, evidence x against A, for
which Chu spaces provide a natural interpretation. We interpret a linear dialectic
-calculus whose types are those expressible in a variant of MLL that while not fully
expressive for all of MLL nevertheless is rich enough to express all MLL
theorems.
Section 4 gives evidence for the universality of ordinary Chu spaces. A small hint of
this universality may be found in Lafont and Streicher [20], who observed that vector
spaces over any Jeld are representable as Chu spaces over the underlying set of that
Jeld, and that coherent spaces and topological spaces are both representable as Chu
spaces over 2= {0; 1}.
As it turns out Chu spaces can represent far more. The main modes of structure
for sets that are traditionally employed in mathematics are relational and topological,
either separately or together, with algebraic structure being obtained from relational.
Chu spaces subsume both kinds of structure, in their full generality, with the one
mechanism. Rather than blending the two, as done with say topological groups, there
is a single uniform construction. The homogeneous universe of Chu spaces appears to
span the entire range of structures, having sets at the discrete end, completek atomic
Boolean algebras at the “coherent” end, and Jnite-dimensional vector spaces, com-
plete semilattices, etc. in the middle, constituting what we have called the Stone
gamut [29]. As we have previously shown [28, 29], archivally documented here, this
representation of relational and topological structures is formalized as a full, faith-
ful, and concrete functor from the category of k-ary relational structures and their
homomorphisms to the category of Chu spaces over an alphabet of cardinality 2k , or
2k+1 when there is topology, being concrete in the sense of preserving the underlying
sets.
In this paper we show also that every small category C embeds fully in Chu(Set; |C|),
and that every small concrete category embeds fully and concretely in Chu(Set; )
where  is the disjoint union of the underlying sets of the category, i.e. the totality of
elements.
In competition with Chu spaces for this role as universal structured objects are such
structures as directed graphs and semigroups, whose universal nature was observed in
the late 1960s in work of TrnkovVa, HedrlVin, Lambek and others [33, 19, 31] showing
that the respective categories of such fully embed all small and all algebraic categories.
However those embeddings are not concrete, typically representing even Jnite objects
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as uncountable graphs or semigroups contrary to the intuitive understanding of the
represented objects.
In contrast, the above representations by Chu spaces are all concrete. That is, the
Chu representation of a concrete structure given by our embeddings has the same
underlying set, and the licensed transformations of those structures, whether by ho-
momorphisms, continuous functions, or whatever, remain the same functions, but now
with a uniform licensing criterion, that of being a morphism of Chu spaces. All that
changes is the representation of the structure associated to those sets. Our representa-
tion of classes of sets and classes of functions between them is thus with the same
sets and functions, di=ering only in how those functions are speciJed and not in which
ones the speciJcation selects.
One would think that the greater generality of V -enriched spaces would embrace
more mathematics, but counterintuitively the opposite seems to be the case: the closer
V is to the “center” of the “Stone gamut” coordinatizing mathematics [29] the smaller
is the universe encompassed by Chu(V; k). Taking V =Set, located at the apparent
edge of the universe, appears to subsume all other V ’s while having the additional
advantage of accessibility, sets being simpler and more familiar than the objects of
pretty much any other choice for V .
For those interested in more hands-on experience with Chu spaces than can be had
from this static paper, http://chu.stanford.edu/ is the URL for Chu Spaces Live,
an interactive menu-driven Chu space calculator written by Larry Yogman. It permits
the user to create and operate on Chu spaces with the operations described in Section
2.3, and includes a substantial tutorial.
2. Chu spaces
2.1. Objects
A Chu space A=(A; r; X ) over an alphabet  consists of a set A of points, a set
X of dual points or states, and a function r : A×X → relating points and states. We
refer to A as the carrier, X as the cocarrier, and r as the interaction matrix.
It is convenient to view Chu spaces as organized either by rows or by columns. For
the former, we deJne rˆ :A→ (X →) as rˆ(a)(x)= r(a; x), and refer to the function
rˆ(a) :X → as row a of A. Dually we deJne Xr :X → (A→) as Xr(x)(a)= r(a; x) and
call Xr(x) :A→ column x of A.
Even before deJning any notion of morphism between Chu spaces we can say that
two Chu spaces are isomorphic when they are identical up to a renaming of their points
and states, i.e. when there is a bijection between their points, and another between their
states, such that they have the same matrix via that bijection.
We call A separated when its matrix has no repeated rows, that is, when rˆ is
injective (rˆ(a)= rˆ(b) implies a= b). The separated collapse of A is the result of
identifying equal rows. Formally it is deJned as the Chu space (rˆ(A); r′; X ) where
rˆ(A)= {rˆ(a) | a∈A} (so rˆ(A)⊆X ) and r′(a; x)= a(x) for a∈ rˆ(A) and x∈X .
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Dually A is extensional when it has no repeated columns. The extensional col-
lapse of A is deJned as (A; r′; Xr(X )) where Xr(X )= { Xr(x) | x∈X } (so Xr(X ) ⊆ A) and
r′(a; x)= x(a) for a∈A and x∈ Xr(X ). A normal Chu space is one which is its own
extensional collapse. Normal spaces may be written as (A; X ), r being understood to
be application.
WhenA is both separated and extensional we call it biextensional. The biextensional
collapse of a Chu space is the result of identifying equal rows, and equal columns,
to produce a biextensional Chu space. We could deJne the biextensional collapse of
(A; r; X ) to be the extensional collapse of the separated collapse or vice versa, but
here we have a dilemma: for the former the points are of type X and the states of
type 
X
while for the latter the respective types are 
A
and A. We can resolve
this democratically by taking the biextensional collapse to be (rˆ(A); r′; Xr(X )) where
r′(rˆ(a); Xr(x))= r(a; x), making the respective types X and A. This di=ers from both
the separated and extensional collapses in that it retains both A and X .
Two Chu spaces are called point-equivalent (resp. state-equivalent) when they have
isomorphic separated (resp. extensional) collapses. Equivalent Chu spaces are simply
those that are both point-equivalent and state-equivalent.
Every operation deJned on general Chu spaces, e.g. those of Section 2.3, has its
counterpart for biextensional Chu spaces obtained by taking the biextensional collapse
as needed.
A discrete Chu space is a normal Chu space (A; X ) for which X =A.
2.2. Chu transforms
A Chu transform is a pair (f; g) consisting of functions f :A→B and g :Y →X
such that s(f(a); y)= r(a; g(y)) for all a in A and y in Y . This equation is a primitive
form of adjointness, which we therefore call the adjointness condition. Such an adjoint
pair (f; g) is called a Chu transform from A to B.
Adjoint pairs (f; g) :A→B and (f′; g′) : B→C, where C=(C; t; Z), compose via
(f′; g′)(f; g)= (f′f; gg′). This composite is itself an adjoint pair because for all a in
A and z in Z we have t(f′f(a); z)= s(f(a); g′(z))= r(a; gg′(z)). The associativity of
this composition is inherited from that of composition in Set, while the pair (1A; 1X )
of identity maps on respectively, A and X is an adjoint pair and is the identity Chu
transform on A.
The notion of isomorphism of Chu spaces can now be deJned more formally as a
Chu transform whose functions are bijections.
The category whose objects are Chu spaces over  and whose morphisms are Chu
transforms composing as above is denoted Chu(Set; ). The full subcategory consisting
of the biextensional Chu spaces is denoted chu(Set; ), so-called “little chu”, with
parent category “big Chu”.
Yet another deJnition of isomorphism of Chu spaces is that it is an isomorphism of
Chu(Set; ).
By the usual abuse of notation we permit a function f :A→B between sets to be
referred to as a function f :A→B between Chu spaces, whence a function from B⊥
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to A⊥ means a function from Y to X . We call a function f :A→B continuous when
it has an adjoint from B⊥ to A⊥, i.e. when there exists a function g : Y →X making
(f; g) a Chu transform. When A is extensional g is determined uniquely by f.
Like discrete topological spaces, discrete Chu spaces transform like sets. More gen-
erally, if A is discrete and B is any Chu space then the Chu transforms from A to
B are exactly the functions from A to B.
2.3. Multiplicative operations
We now deJne a number of operations on Chu spaces. These operations are of
independent interest but our rationale for them in this paper will be as interpretations of
the connectives of linear logic, which we treat in the next section. The main operations
for this paper are the multiplicatives, which we therefore treat Jrst.
Negation. The dual or linear negation A⊥ of A=(A; r; X ) is deJned as (X; r Y; A)
where r Y : X ×A→ satisJes r Y(x; a)= r(a; x).
When A is separable, A⊥ is extensional; likewise when A is extensional, A⊥ is
separable. Thus negation preserves biextensionality, whence both big Chu and little
chu are biextensional.
The deJnition of A⊥ makes A⊥⊥ not merely isomorphic to A but equal to it.
Tensor. The tensor product A⊗B of A=(A; r; X ) and B=(B; s; Y ) is deJned as
(A×B; t;F) where F ⊂ YA×X B is the set of all pairs (f; g) of functions f :A→Y ,
g : B→X for which s(b; f(a))= r(a; g(b)) for all a∈A and b∈B, and t : (A×B)×F
is given by t((a; b); f)= s(b; f(a)) (= r(a; g(b))).
Associated with tensor product is the tensor unit 1, namely the space ({0}; r; )
where r(0; k)= k.
A⊗B can be understood as interacting conjunction as follows. Its points (a; b) are
to be understood as the possible interactions of the points a∈A with the points b∈B.
Each state (f; g) indicates which state B appears to be in when viewed from point a
of A, namely f(a), and symmetrically which state A appears to be in when viewed
from point b of B, namely g(b).
Tensor is conjunction in the sense that the total constraint on the states of A⊗B
is representable as the conjunction of the constraints imposed separately by each of A
and B, respectively (i) and (ii) in the following.
Elsewhere we have proposed tensor product as an operation of process algebra, called
orthocurrence or Row-through [27, 12].
WhenA and B are extensional it suQces to takeF to consist instead of all functions
m :A×B→ such that (i) for every a∈A there exists y∈Y such that for all b∈B,
m(a; b)= s(b; y); and (ii) for every b∈B there exists x∈X such that for all a∈A,
m(a; b)= r(a; x). Extensionality of A ensures that the y promised in (i) is the unique
y for which Xs(y)= b:m(a; b), whence m uniquely determines the f :A→Y of the Jrst
deJnition of F above, with the view from point a of A being the state b:m(a; b) of
B. Likewise extensionality of B ensures that the same m uniquely determines g, with
the view from point b of B being the state a:m(a; b) of A. This puts the m’s in
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this deJnition of F in bijection with the (f; g) pairs in the Jrst deJnition of F, via
m(a; b)= s(b; f(a))= r(a; g(b)).
A state of A⊗B may be visualized as a solution to an A×B crossword puzzle
having no blacked-out squares. To this end we construe a state of A as a word of
“length” A over the alphabet , with each point a of A constituting a “position” in
the word. It is unimportant what order if any we attach to these positions. The set of
states of A constitutes the dictionary of vertical words for the puzzle, and that of B
the horizontal dictionary. The states of A⊗B are then all possible solutions to the
puzzle, namely all possible A×B matrices whose columns are words of A and whose
rows are words of B.
When A and B are extensional, A⊗B is extensional by deJnition: two distinct
functions in F must di=er at a particular point (a; b). It need not however be sepa-
rable, witness A⊗A where A is the 2-point 2-state space with matrix 0001 . The two
“crossword solutions” here are 0000 and
00
01 . Hence A⊗A is a 4-point 2-state space
three of whose points are represented by the row 00 and one by the row 01. The
biextensional collapse of this identiJes the three 00 rows to yield the biextensional
space 0001 .
Functoriality. We have deJned A⊥ and A⊗B only for Chu spaces. We now
make these operations functors on Chu(Set; ) by extending their respective domains
to include morphisms.
Given (f; g) :A→B, (f; g)⊥ :B⊥→A⊥ is deJned to be (g; f). This suggests
writing the adjoint g as f⊥, which we do henceforth.
Given functions f :A→A′ and g :B→B′, deJne f⊗ g :A⊗B→A′⊗B′ to be
the function (f⊗ g)(a; b)= (f(a); g(b)). When f and g are continuous, so is f⊗ g,
whose adjoint (f⊗ g)⊥ from G to F (where G and F consist respectively of pairs
(h′ :A′→Y ′; k ′ :B′→X ′) and (h :A→Y; k :B→X )) sends h′ :A′→Y ′ to g⊥h′f :A→Y .
Laws. Tensor is commutative and associative, albeit only up to a natural isomor-
phism : A⊗B∼=B⊗A and A⊗ (B⊗C)∼=(A⊗B)⊗C. The naturality of these
isomorphisms follows immediately from that of the corresponding isomorphisms in
Set. We show their continuity separately for each law.
For commutativity, the isomorphism is (; ) : (A⊗B)→ (B⊗A) where A⊗B
=(A×B; t;F), B⊗A=(B×A; u;G),  :A⊗B→B⊗A satisJes (a; b)= (b; a), and
 :G→F satisJes (g; f)= (f; g). The continuity of (; ) then follows from u((a; b);
(g; f))= u((b; a); (g; f))= r(a; g(b))= s(b; f(a))= t((a; b); (f; g))= t((a; b); ⊥(g; f)),
for all (a; b) in A×B and (g; f) in G.
For associativity, let A=(A; r; X ), B=(B; s; Y ), and C=(C; t; Z). Observe that both
(A⊗B)⊗C and A⊗ (B⊗C) can be understood as (A×B×C; u;F) where F con-
sists of all functions m :A×B×C→ satisfying the conjunction of three conditions:
(i) for all b; c there exists x such that for all a, m(a; b; c)= r(a; x); (ii) for all c; a there
exists y such that for all b, m(a; b; c)= s(b; y); and (iii) for all a; b there exists z such
that for all c, m(a; b; c)= t(c; z). In the imagery of crosswords, A, B and C supply
the dictionaries for the respective axes of a three-dimensional crossword puzzle, with
a:m(a; b; c) denoting the word in m at point (b; c) of B×C parallel to the A axis and
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similarly for the word b:m(a; b; c) at (c; a) parallel to the B axis and c:m(a; b; c) at
(a; b) parallel to the C axis.
With this observation we can now describe the isomorphism between (A⊗B)⊗C
and A⊗ (B⊗C): on the points it is the usual set-theoretic isomorphism of (A×B)×C
and A× (B×C), while on the states it is the correspondence pairing each map
m : (A × B) × C →  with the map m′ :A × (B×C) →  satisfying m′(a; (b; c))=
m((a; b); c). It is immediate that this pair of bijections is a Chu transform. Hence
tensor is associative up to this isomorphism. 3
The tensor unit behaves as such, i.e. A⊗ 1∼=A, via the evident isomorphism pairing
(a; 0) with a.
Linear implication. We deJne linear implication, namely A(B, as (A⊗B⊥)⊥.
It follows that A(B=(F; t; A×Y ) where F is the set of all pairs (f; g), f :A→B
and g :Y →X , satisfying the adjointness condition for Chu transforms.
For little chu, biextensional spaces, the crossword puzzle metaphor applies. A func-
tion f :A→B may then be represented as an A×Y matrix m over , namely m(a; y)
e= s(f(a); y), while a function g :B⊥→A⊥ may be represented as a Y ×A matrix
over , namely m(y; a)= r(a; g(y)). For such spaces we then have an alternative char-
acterization of continuity : a function is continuous just when the converse (transpose)
of its representation represents a function from B⊥ to A⊥.
With biextensional arguments A(B is separable but not necessarily extensional for
the same reason A⊗B is extensional but not necessarily separable. Hence to make
A(B biextensional, equal columns must be identiJed.
2.4. Other operations
Besides the multiplicative operations, linear logic has additives, which are general-
izable to limits and colimits, and exponentials.
Additives: The additive connectives of linear logic are plus A⊕B and with A&B,
with respective units 0 and . A⊕B is deJned as (A + B; t; X ×Y ) where A + B is
the disjoint union of A and B while t(a; (x; y))= r(a; x) and t(b; (x; y))= s(b; y). Its
unit 0 is the discrete empty space having no points and one state. For morphisms
f :A→A′, g :B→B′, f⊕ g :A⊕B→A′⊕B′ sends a∈A to f(a) ∈ A′ and
b ∈ B to g(b) ∈ B′. With as the De Morgan dual of plus is deJned for both objects
and morphisms by A&B=(A⊥⊕B⊥)⊥, while =0⊥.
Limits and colimits: The additives furnish Chu spaces with only Jnite discrete limits
and colimits. In particular,A⊕B is a coproduct ofA and B whileA&B is a product
of them.
In fact, Chu(Set; ) is bicomplete, having all small limits and colimits, which it
inherits in the following straightforward way from Set. Given any diagram D : J →
3 If Set is organized to make cartesian product associative “on the nose”, i.e. up to identity, possible
assuming the Axiom of Choice though not if Set is not skeletal [24, p. 161], then tensor product in
Chu(Set; ) is also associative on the nose.
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Chu(Set; ) where J is a small category, the limit of D is obtained independently for
points and states in respectively Set and Set◦.
Exponentials: The exponential !A serves syntactically to “loosen up” the formula
A so that it can be duplicated or deleted. It achieves this by adding enough states to
A. Semantically as an operation on Chu(Set; ) it serves to retract that domain to a
cartesian closed subcategory.
A candidate for this subcategory is that of the discrete Chu spaces (A; A), a
subcategory equivalent to the category Set of sets and functions. This exponential
adds all possible states to A to make it discrete, the ultimate in “loosening up”. A
larger subcategory that is also cartesian closed is that of the comonoids, which
we now deJne.
A comonoid in Chu(Set; ) is a Chu space A for which the diagonal function
 :A→A⊗A and the unique function  :A→ 1 are continuous (where 1 is the
tensor unit). These two functions constitute the interpretation of duplication and
deletion respectively, in that (a)= (a; a) (a is duplicated) and  (a)= () (a
is deleted).
An equivalent deJnition of comonoid is as a Chu space A such that (i) for each
element of  there exists a column of A all of whose entries are that element (this
makes  continuous), and (ii) every state of A⊗A construed as an A×A matrix has
for its main diagonal a column of A (this makes  continuous).
It is immediate that discrete Chu spaces satisfy both (i) and (ii) and hence are
comonoids.
A normal comonoid is a comonoid that is a normal Chu space (A; X ), one whose state
set X is a subset of A. The comonoid generated by a normal Chu space A=(A; X ),
denoted !A, is deJned as the normal comonoid (A; Y ) having the least Y ⊇X . That
this Y exists is a corollary of the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Given any family of comonoids (A; Xi) with ;xed carrier A; (A;
⋂
i Xi) is
a comonoid. (When the family is empty we de;ne
⋂
i Xi to be 
A.)
Proof. The case of the empty family is covered by the remark three paragraphs back.
The unique function from (A; X ) to 1 is continuous just when X includes every constant
function. All the Xi’s must have this property and therefore so does their intersection.
Given A=(A; X ),  :A→A⊗A is continuous just when every A×A crossword
solution with dictionary X has for its leading diagonal a word from X . It follows that
if a solution uses words found in every dictionary Xi, then the diagonal is found in
every Xi. Hence the dictionary
⋂
i Xi also has this property.
Therefore (A;
⋂
i Xi) is a comonoid.
The domain of the ! operation is easily extended to arbitrary Chu spaces by Jrst
taking the extensional collapse.
Barr has pointed out to us that !A is cofree for the category of extensional Chu
spaces over , but not for the larger category of all Chu spaces over .
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Table 1
System S1: (AA′ and BB′)
T (P⊥1 oP1)⊗ · · · ⊗ (P⊥n oPn); n¿1
A1 (A⊗B)⊗C A⊗ (B⊗C)
A2 (AoB)oC Ao (BoC)
C1 A⊗BB⊗A
C2 AoBBoA
D (AoB)⊗C Ao (B⊗C)
E1 A⊗BA′⊗B′
E2 AoBA′ oB′
3. Relationship of Chu spaces to linear logic
3.1. Language
We have already encountered the linear logic connectives in the form of functors
on Chu(Set; ), which we shall take as the Chu interpretations of the linear logic
connectives. What makes linear logic a logic is its axiomatization and its relationship to
those interpretations, the subject of this section. We give two axiomatizations, systems
S1 and S2, the latter being more suited to interpretation over Chu spaces. In the
process we give a tight correspondence between the two systems in terms of linkings
and switchings.
Linear logic is usually axiomatized in terms of Gentzen sequents $ %. However it
can also be axiomatized in Hilbert style, with AB denoting not a Gentzen sequent
but rather that B is derivable from A in the system, the approach we follow here.
We conJne our attention to the multiplicative fragment, MLL, further simpliJed by
omitting the constants 1 and 1⊥=⊥, which is suQcient to illustrate the relationship
between the Chu interpretation of the linear logic connectives and their axiomatization.
It will be convenient to assume a normal form for the language in which implications
A(B have been expanded as A⊥oB and all negations have been pushed down to the
leaves. Accordingly we deJne a formula A (B; C; : : :) to be either a literal P (an atom
or propositional variable or its negation), a conjunction A⊗B of two formulas, or a
disjunction AoB of two formulas. When P is a literal of the form Q⊥ then P⊥ de-
notes the literal Q. This simpliJes the axiom system by permitting double negation, the
De Morgan laws, and all properties of implication to be omitted from the axiomatiza-
tion. Call this monotone MLL.
3.2. Axiomatization
We axiomatize MLL with one axiom schema together with rules for associativity,
commutativity, and linear or weak distributivity (see Table 1).
The rules have the interesting feature of all having exactly one premise. 4 This makes
the system cut-free, lacking the cut rule either in the form “from A(B and B(C
4 We view T purely as an axiom and not also as a rule with no premises.
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infer A(C”, or as modus ponens, “from A and A(B infer C.” It also performs all
collecting of theorems at the outset in a single axiom rather than later via a rule of the
form A; BA⊗B. We may then treat  as a binary relation on formulas, being deJned
as the reRexive transitive closure of the binary relation whose pairs are all substitution
instances of the above rules. We read AB as A derives B, or B is deducible from A.
Rules A1 and A2 express associativity of ⊗ , while Rules C1 and C2 express its
symmetry (commutativity). Rule D is linear distributivity. Rules E1 and E2 express
functoriality; they assume AA′ and BB′, allowing the rules to be applied to sub-
formulas. The  deJned by this system is not altered by imposing the restriction that
either AA′ be an instance of one of the rules A1-D, and B=B′, or vice versa, i.e.
when only one side of A⊗B can be rewritten by E1 at a time.
An instance of T is determined by a choice of association for the n − 1⊗’s and a
choice of n literals (atoms P or negated atoms P⊥). When P⊥i is instantiated with Q
⊥
the resulting double negation is cancelled, as in the instance (Q⊥oQ)⊗ ((P⊥oP)⊗
(QoQ⊥)) which instantiates P1 with Q and P3 with Q⊥.
An MLL theorem B is any formula deducible from an instance A of axiom schema
T, i.e. one for which AB holds. For example (P⊗Q)( (P⊗Q), which abbreviates
(P⊥oQ⊥)o (P⊗Q), can be proved as follows from instance (P⊥oP)⊗ (Q⊥oQ)
of T.
(P⊥oP)⊗ (Q⊥oQ)  P⊥o (P ⊗ (Q⊥oQ)) (D)
 P⊥o ((Q⊥oQ)⊗ P) (C1; E2)
 P⊥o (Q⊥o (Q ⊗ P)) (D; E2)
 P⊥o (Q⊥o (P ⊗ Q)) (C1; E2)
 (P⊥oQ⊥)o (P ⊗ Q)) (A2)
3.3. Semantics
Multiplicative linear logic has essentially the same language as propositional Boolean
logic, though only a proper subset of its theorems. But whereas the characteristic
concern of Boolean logic is truth, separating the true from the false, that of linear
logic is proof, connecting premises to consequents.
In Boolean logic proofs are considered syntactic entities. While MLL derivations in
S1 are no less syntactic intrinsically, they admit an abstraction which can be understood
as the underlying semantics of MLL, constituting its abstract proofs. These are cut-free
proofs, S1 being a cut-free system.
DeJne a linking L of a formula A to be a matching of complementary pairs or links
P; P⊥ of literal occurrences. Call such a pair (A; L) a cut-free proof structure [17], or
just proof structure as we shall be working exclusively with cut-free proofs.
There exist both syntactic and semantic characterizations of theorems in terms of
linkings, which Danos and Regnier have shown to be equivalent [13].
For the syntactic characterization, every MLL derivation of a theorem A determines a
proof structure as follows. The proof structure determined by an instance of T matches
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P⊥i and Pi in each conjunct. Since the rules neither delete nor create subformulas but
simply move them around, the identities of the literals are preserved and hence so is
their linking. Hence the rules can be understood as transforming not just formulas but
proof structures. Call a proof structure sound, or a proof net, when it can be derived
from that of an axiom instance by the rules of S1. It is immediate that A is a theorem
if and only if it has a sound proof structure.
For the semantic characterization, deJne a switching ) for a formula A to be a
marking of one disjunct in each disjunction occurring in A; since disjunctions are
binary and there are n of them, there are 2n possible switchings. A linking L of A and
a switching ) for L together determine an undirected graph G(A; L; )) whose vertices
are the 4n − 1 subformulas of A, consisting of 2n literals, n − 1 conjunctions, and n
disjunctions, and whose edges consist of:
(i) the n pairs (Pi; P⊥i ) of literals matched by the linking;
(ii) the 2n− 2 pairs (B; C) where B is a conjunction in A and C is either of B’s two
conjuncts; and
(iii) the n pairs (B; C) where B is a disjunction in A and C is the disjunct in B marked
by ) (n disjunctions hence n such edges).
(The linear logic literature refers to G(A; L; )) itself as a switching.)
Call a proof structure (A; L) valid when for all switchings ) for L, G(A; L; )) is a
tree (connected acyclic graph). 5
The more usual term for this notion in the linear logic literature is “proof structure
satisfying the Danos–Regnier criterion”. However the criterion seems to us semantical
in the same sense as validity in Boolean propositional calculus, which is deJned as
truth over all assignments of truth values to variables. If we regard linear logic as fun-
damentally a proof-oriented “connectionist” logic, in contradistinction to Boolean logic
as a truth-oriented “separationist” logic, and if we view switching as the connectionist
counterpart of truth assignment, then a condition that universally quantiJes over all
switchings is just as much a notion of validity as is one that universally quantiJes
over all truth assignments.
With this perspective we may then restate Danos and Regnier’s celebrated theorem
[13] as follows.
Theorem 2 (Danos–Regnier). A proof structure is sound if and only if it is valid.
This result constitutes a form of completeness result for MLL. However it is stronger
than the usual notion of completeness in that it sets up a bijection between syntactic
and semantic criteria for theoremhood called full completeness, the term coined by
Abramsky and Jagadeesan for their game semantics of MLL [1] but equally applicable
to switching semantics. Here the bijection is identiJcation: the valid linking that each
sound linking is paired with is itself. The sound linkings of A constitute abstract proofs
5 There being 4n − 1 vertices and 4n − 2 edges, had G(A; L; )) failed to be a tree it would necessarily
have done so by both being disconnected and containing a cycle.
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of A, semantically justiJed by their validity. For transformational semantics as treated in
Section 3.8, the corresponding bijection is between cut-free proofs (as sound linkings)
and transformations meeting a suitable naturality condition such as dinaturality or binary
logicality.
3.4. Syntactic expression of linking
The boundary between syntax and semantics is not sharp, and semantical informa-
tion can often be encoded syntactically. For example, the satisfying assignments of a
Boolean formula can be represented syntactically by putting the formula in disjunctive
normal form, with each disjunct (conjunction of literals) then denoting those satisfying
assignments for which the positive literals in the disjunct are assigned true and the
negative false. When all the atoms occurring in a formula occur in every disjunct, either
positively or negatively, the disjuncts are in bijection with the satisfying assignments.
The semantical notions of linking and switching can likewise be incorporated into
MLL formulas. We begin with linking, the key idea for which is to label each atom
with the name of the link it belongs to.
In general a formula A may have many linkings or no linking. But for a binary
formula, one such that every atom occurring in A does so once positively and once
negatively (e.g. when all Pi’s of T are distinct), there exists a unique linking. Con-
versely, a linking of an arbitrary formula A determines a binary formula A′ obtained
from A by assigning distinct names to the links and subscripting each atom with the
name of the link it belongs to. It follows that the notions of a proof structure and
a binary formula can be used interchangeably. It should be borne in mind that the
theoremhood question for a formula is in general harder than for a proof structure or
a binary formula.
Since we will be dealing only with proof structures (A; L) in this section, we may
assume for the rest of this section that all formulas are binary. The links still exist but
they are now uniquely determined by A alone, having been absorbed into the language.
G(A; L; )) becomes just G(A; )), and instead of saying the linking L of A is sound or
valid we can simply say that the binary formula A is provable or valid respectively.
The Danos–Regnier theorem then says more simply that a binary formula A is provable
if and only if it is valid.
3.5. Syntactic expression of switching
Switching semantics is well motivated in that it serves as a crucial stepping stone for
all known completeness proofs of other MLL semantics. A more intrinsic motivation
for it however is based on the notion of information Row in proofs. In the Chu inter-
pretation this Row is realized by transformations. However the Row can be understood
abstractly in its own right, which we treat prior to considering the transformational
interpretation of such Rows. The key idea here is the choice of A⊥(B or A◦−B⊥
as direction-encoding synonyms for the direction-neutral AoB. Marking o with each
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of two possible directions permits us to reconcile the commutativity of o with our
-calculus interpretation of the axiom and rules of system S2.
The customary direction of Row in assigning a denotation to an expression is upwards
in the tree, with the denotation of the expression Rowing from leaves to root. But now
consider the theorem (P⊗ (P(Q))(Q. There is a natural direction of Row starting
from P through P(Q and ending at Q. The Row at P(Q would seem to go from
the P leaf up to the ( thence down to the Q leaf.
Now this theorem is just an abbreviation of (P⊥o (P⊗Q⊥))oQ, whose connec-
tives can be reassociated and permuted to yield P⊥o (Qo (P⊗Q⊥)). The latter can
be abbreviated as P( (Q⊥( (P⊗Q⊥)), with the Row now taking on the form of a
pair of Rows from P to P and from Q⊥ to Q⊥, changing the apparent direction of one
of the two o ’s.
This example suggests the possibility of correlating switchings with theorems stated
using implications. In fact, there exists a very good correlation taking the form of
a bijection between the essential switchings of a binary theorem A and the set of
bi-implicational expressions of A, terms that we now deJne.
Essential switchings. Given a binary theorem A, the tree G(A; )) induced by a
switching ) is made a directed graph by orienting its edges towards the root. Non-link
edges, namely those connecting a conjunction or disjunction to one of its operands, may
be oriented either downwards or upwards (we follow the usual convention of putting
the root of a parse tree at the top; the linear logic literature tends to invert this). Call
a conjunction or disjunction downwards or upwards in G(A; )) according respectively
to whether or not a downwards edge is incident on it. The root is necessarily upwards.
For example, in (P⊥o (P⊗Q⊥))oQ, P⊗Q is downwards for all switchings save
that in which the Jrst o is switched to the right and the second to the left, and for
that switching the links are oriented P⊥ to P and Q to Q⊥.
We now analyze the topology of G=G(A; )) at any given o . For any subformula
B=C oD, if the edge from B (meaning the root of B) to whichever of C or D
it is directly connected to is removed, G must separate into two trees. The tree con-
taining vertex B cannot contain either C or D or there would be a cycle when the
corresponding edge from B is put in. Hence the other tree must contain both C
and D.
Now suppose B is an upward disjunction. Then whichever of C or D was directly
connected to B in G must be the root of the tree containing it, and the other of C
or D a leaf. This is interchanged by changing the switching at B, which has the side
e=ect of reversing all edges along the path between C and D.
If however B is a downward disjunction, then both C and D are leaves of their
common tree. Changing the switching at B does not change this fact, nor the orientation
of any edge in either tree.
In the above example (P⊥o (P⊗Q⊥))oQ, when the second o is switched to the
right, the Jrst o becomes downwards. In that case the path to the root starts at P⊥
and proceeds via P, P⊗Q⊥, Q⊥, and Q ending at the root (P⊥o (P⊗Q⊥))oQ;
the direction of the Jrst o connects the vertex P⊥o (P⊗Q⊥) to one of P⊥ or
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P⊗Q⊥. Changing that connection does not reverse any edge but merely replaces one
downwards edge from P⊥o (P⊗Q⊥) by the other.
An essential switching is one that records the direction only of the upward disjunc-
tions for that switching. We can think of the downwards disjunctions as being recorded
as X for don’t-care. This has the e=ect of identifying those switchings di=ering only
at their downward disjunctions. Thus (P⊥o (P⊗Q⊥))oQ has only three essential
switchings because when the second o is switched to the right we ignore the now
downward Jrst o.
3.6. Bi-implication
We would like to interpret the formulas A⊗B and AoB as types. With the Chu
interpretations of these connectives in mind, we regard entities of the former type as
pairs, and of the latter as functions, either from A⊥ to B or from B⊥ to A.
Now the connectives appearing in the rules of S1 are just ⊗ and o, without any
negations A⊥. It would be a pity to have to introduce negations as a side e=ect of
interpreting AoB as consisting of functions. To avoid this we shall make ( perform
the role of o, allowing us to talk of functions of type A(B.
This works Jne except for rule C2, commutativity of o, which must rewrite A(B
as B⊥(A⊥. To avoid having negation appear in C2 we adopt A◦−B as a synonym
for B⊥(A⊥.
With this motivation we introduce the language of bi-implicational MLL. A formula
in this language is one that is built up from literals using ⊗; (, and ◦−.
We axiomatize bi-implicational MLL as follows. The axiom and rules are obtained
from System S1 by rewriting each AoB in T or on the left side of a rule by ei-
ther A⊥(B or A◦−B⊥ in all possible combinations, with the negations pushed down
to the metavariables (A; B; C; : : :) and with any resulting negative metavariables then
instantiated with their complement.
By P ◦−◦P we mean the choice of P(P or P ◦−P, where P is a literal as for
system S1, with the choice made independently for each of the n implications of T.
Thus T has 2n instantiations for any given selection of n literals. As before we assume
AA′ and BB′ for E1–E3.
As with system S1, the only negations are on literals and remain there, and the rules
do not mention negation, catering solely for ⊗, (, and ◦−.
Theorem 3. The binary theorems of S2 are in bijection with the pairs (A; )) where
A is a binary theorem of S1 and ) is an essential switching for A.
(Note that di=erent linkings of the same nonbinary theorem can a=ect which switch-
ings are essential. Hence we cannot strengthen this to a bijection between the theorems
of S2 and pairs (A; )) where A is a theorem of S1, since not all linkings of A need
be compatible with the same ).)
Proof. We exhibit a map in each direction and prove that they compose in either order
to the respective identity. Neither map by itself requires induction on length of proofs
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Table 2
System S2
T (P1 ◦−◦P1)⊗ · · · ⊗ (Pn ◦−◦Pn); n¿1
A1 (A⊗B)⊗C A⊗ (B⊗C)
A2 (A⊗B)(C A( (B(C)
A2′ (A(B) ◦−C A( (B ◦−C)




D (A(B)⊗C A( (B⊗C)
D′ (A ◦−B)⊗C A ◦− (B ◦−C)
E1 A⊗BA′⊗B′
E2 A′(BA(B′
E3 A ◦−B′ A′ ◦−B
to specify the map, but does require it in order to prove theoremhood of the result
(see Table 2).
We translate theorems of S2 to formulas of S1 via bi-implication expansion. This is
simply the result of rewriting each A(B as A⊥oB and A ◦−B as AoB⊥ and pushing
the negations down to the literals via De Morgan’s laws for ⊗ and o, canceling double
negations. 6
Applying this translation to S2 converts it to S1. It follows by induction on length
of proofs that every theorem of S2 translates in this way to a theorem of S1.
For the other direction, we are given a binary theorem A of S1 together with a
switching ) and want a theorem of S2. We can specify a formula without using induc-
tion on length of proofs by appealing to the Danos–Regnier theorem. The switching
determines a graph G(A; )), oriented as in the description above of essential switchings.
Rewrite each downward disjunction B=C oD as (C⊥⊗D⊥)⊥. Note that this rewrit-
ing ignores the direction of switching at this o. Rewrite each upward disjunction
B=C oD as either C ◦−D⊥ or C⊥(D according to whether C or D, respectively,
is the marked disjunct. Lastly rewrite each downward conjunction B⊗C as either
(B⊥ ◦−C)⊥ or (B(C⊥)⊥ according to whether the path from B⊗C goes to B or C,
respectively. Cancel any double negations that arise directly from this translation. Call
the Jnal result the )-translation of A.
We now claim that the )-translation of a binary theorem of S1 is a formula in the
language of S2. To see this observe that the negations introduced by this rewriting ap-
pear only on downward edges. Morever every downward edge between two compound
subformulas (i.e. not involving a literal) receives a negation at each end, whence all
such negations may be cancelled directly without bothering to apply De Morgan’s laws
to push negations down. The only remaining negations are then those on nonlink edges
6 For noncommutative linear logic [3] the De Morgan laws also reverse order; here we leave the order
unchanged so as to preserve the exact structure of all formulas.
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involving literals. If the literal is P⊥ then we have another pair of negations that may
be cancelled. If it is P then leave the negation in place so that it becomes P⊥, and
observe that the literal to which P (now negated) is linked is P⊥. It follows that the
only remaining negations are at literals, and furthermore that links connect occurrences
of the same literal (in S1 they connected complementary pairs). Such a formula is in
the language of S2.
We further claim that this formula is a theorem of S2. To see this proceed by
induction of the length of proofs in S1. For the basis case, translating an instance of
T in S1 turns the ith disjunctions into one of P(P, P ◦−P, P⊥(P⊥, or P⊥ ◦−P⊥
depending on the sign of Pi in the S1 theorem and the direction determined by ) for
that o in the )-translation.
For the inductive step, every way of rewriting the o’s on the left of a rule of
S1 as either ( or ◦− is represented on the left of some rule of S2. (Associativity
has only three such combinations rather than four for essentially the same reason
that (P⊥o (P⊗Q⊥))oQ has only three essential switchings: when the second o is
switched to the right the Jrst o becomes downwards, and translates to ⊗ which does
not have separate notations for its two directions.) Hence every step of an S1 derivation
can be mimicked by an S2 step, preserving the claimed bijection. This completes the
proof of the claim.
It should now be clear that the two translations are mutually inverse, establishing
the bijection claimed by the theorem.
What we have shown in e=ect is that S1 and S2 are equivalent axiomatizations of
MLL, modulo the di=erence in language and the additional information in S2 about
the switching. From the Danos–Regnier theorem we have that each binary theorem A
of S1 in monotone MLL corresponds to a set of theorems of S2 in bi-implicational
MLL, one for each essential switching of A.
Higher order theorems. Note that rule D′ of S2 may increase order (depth of nesting
of implications in the antecedent). This allows S2 to prove theorems of arbitrarily high
order limited only by n. For example, with n=3 we can proceed using only D’ as
follows to obtain a theorem of order 5.
(P(P)⊗ ((Q(Q)⊗ (R(R))  (P(P)⊗ (((R(R)(Q)(Q)
 ((((R(R)(Q)(Q)(P)(P:
Starting from an axiom of order one, each step adds two to the order. Thus if we
had started with n implications, in n − 1 steps we would by the above process prove
a theorem of order 2n− 1.
Negative literals. Having avoided negation everywhere else it seems a shame to have
negative literals in formulas. This is unavoidable if S1 theorems such as (PoP)(
(PoP) are to have S2 counterparts, since such theorems cannot be expressed in the
bi-implicational language using only positive literals.
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3.7. The dialectic -calculus
One popular formulation of constructive logic is based on the notion of evidence
a for a proposition A, written a :A. The Curry–Howard isomorphism of types and
propositions reads a :A ambiguously as an element a of type A, and as evidence a for
proposition A. It further reads A×B ambiguously as the product of types A and B,
and as conjunction of propositions; thus evidence a for A and b for B constitutes
evidence (a; b) for the conjunction A×B. Similarly A→B is read as the function space
from A to B and the implication of B by A. Evidence for an implication A→B takes the
form of a function f :A→B which given evidence a for A produces evidence f(a)
for B.
Proofs as evidence for theorems may in a suitable setting be identiJed with closed
terms of the simply-typed -calculus. For example, the closed term (a; b) :A×B:(b; a) :
B×A proves the theorem A×B→B×A while a :A:b :B:a :A proves A→ (B→A).
From the viewpoint of system S2 above, the -calculus has the limitation that the
direction of f :A→B is always from A to B. This is not compatible with switching
semantics, which capriciously chooses a direction for every o. This is where Chu
spaces enter the picture. A Chu space consists of not one but two sets A and X ,
both of which can be thought of evidence. But whereas points a∈A serve as evidence
for A, states x of X , the underlying set of A⊥, can be thought of as evidence
against A, i.e. evidence for the negation A⊥, an interpretation suggested by Plotkin
[conversation].
Now we could write x :A⊥ but this requires writing A⊥ in the rules, which we
would like to avoid as not matching up well to S2. Instead we shall introduce a new
notation x ··A, dual to a :A, expressing that x is evidence against A, permitting us to
avoid saying “evidence for A⊥”. In the Chu space interpretation of a proposition A as
a Chu space A=(A; r; X ), evidence a for A is a point of A while evidence x against
A is a state of A.
We realize evidence for A(B as an adjoint pair (f;f′) of functions, one mapping
evidence for A to evidence for B, the other mapping evidence against B to evidence
against A. (Abbreviating (f;f′) to f is permitted; the use of semicolon instead of
comma avoids the ambiguity that would otherwise arise when say the pair ((f;f′); g)
is abbreviated to (f; g).) Evidence for B ◦−A is then (f′;f), as an application of
commutativity. Note this is not the same thing as evidence against A(B, i.e. f or
A⊗B⊥, namely a pair (a; x) consisting of evidence for A and evidence against B.
With GZodel’s Dialectica interpretation and the work of de Paiva [14, 15] in mind,
we call this variant of the simply-typed -calculus the dialectic -calculus. The two
language features distinguishing it from the simply-typed -calculus, taken to have the
usual exponentiation operator → and also × for convenience, are a second implication
←, and the notion x ··A of evidence against, dual to evidence for, a :A.
The linear dialectic -calculus imposes the additional requirement that every -
binding binds exactly one variable occurrence in the formula. We distinguish the linear
case in the manner of linear logic by writing ⊗;(, and ◦− in place of ×;→, and ←.
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Table 3
Transformations associated to rules of S2
A1 ((a; b); c) : (A⊗B)⊗C : (a; (b; c)) :A⊗ (B⊗C)
A2 f : (A⊗B)−◦C : a :A : b :B : f(a; b) :C
A2′ f : (A−◦B) ◦−C : a :A : y ··B : f(a; y) ··C
A2′′ f : (A ◦−B) ◦−C : x ··A : b :B : f(x; b) ··C
C1 (a; b) :A⊗B : (b; a) :B⊗A
C2 (f;f′) :A−◦B : (f′;f) :B ◦−A
C2′ (f;f′) :A ◦−B : (f′;f) :B−◦A
D (f; c) : (A−◦B)⊗C : a :A : (f(a); c) :B⊗C
D′ (f; c) : (A ◦−B)⊗C : x ··A : (f(x); c) ··B ◦−C
E1 (a; b) :A⊗B : (f(a); g(b)) :A′⊗B′
E2 h :A′−◦B : ghf :A−◦B′
E3 h :A ◦−B′ : g′hf′ :A′ ◦−B
We now specify in full the language of the linear dialectic -calculus. Examples of all
constructs can be found in Table 3. Terms are built up from variables a; b; : : : ; x; y; : : :
and types A; B; : : : using -abstraction, application, and pairing. All terms are typed
either positively or negatively.
A type is any bi-implicational MLL formula A all of whose literals are positive. The
atoms P;Q; : : : of A constitute its ground types. In the terminology of context-free or
BNF grammars, P;Q; : : : here play the role of terminal symbols or actual type variables
while A; B; : : : serve as nonterminal symbols or type metavariables.
A variable a; b; : : : ; x; y; : : : of the -calculus is either positively typed as in a :A or
negatively typed as in x ··A. Both positively and negatively typed variables are drawn
from the same set of variables, but by convention we will usually use a; b; c; : : : for
positively typed variables and x; y; z; : : : for negative as an aid to keeping track of the
sign of its type.
A positive application MN consists of a pair of terms positively typed respectively
A(B and A, 7 and is positively typed B. A negative application MN consists of a pair
of terms, with M positively typed A ◦−B and N negatively typed A, and is negatively
typed B. For linearity M and N must have no free variables in common, either as an
occurrence or as a.
A positive or consistent pair is a term (M :A; N :B) positively typed by A⊗B.
A negative or conRicting pair is either a term (M :A; N ··B) negatively typed by A(B
or (M ··A; N :B) negatively typed by A ◦−B. For linearity M and N must have no -
variables in common, either as an occurrence or as a. (In consequence of this and
the corresponding rule for application, a -variable can appear just once in the form
a.)
A positive -abstraction is a term a :A:M :B positively typed A(B, and the vari-
able a must occur in M with positive type A. A negative -abstraction is a term
7 Were we trying to follow noncommutative linear logic more closely we would presumably write positive
applications in the reverse order, NM , along with some other order reversals.
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x ··A:M ··B positively typed B ◦−A, and the variable x must occur in M with nega-
tive type A.
When the variable a of a -abstraction is positively typed by a conjunction or neg-
atively typed by an implication (in which case we will have usually written x rather
than a), a may be expanded as the pair (a1; a2) where the ai’s are variables of the
appropriate type and sign depending on A and its sign. This expansion may be applied
recursively to the ai’s, as for example in rule A1 of Table 3.
When a is positively typed by an implication, a may be written (a1; a2) but the ai’s
do not have any type of their own independent of that of a. Unlike -bound pairs
(a; b), -bound functions (a1; a2) cannot be split up, and the occurrence of the ai’s in
M is restricted to either (a1; a2) positively typed by the implication A (either A1(A2
or A1 ◦−A2) or (a2; a1) positively typed by the reverse implication (respectively either
A2 ◦−A1 or A2(A1).
This completes the speciJcation of the language of the linear dialectic -calculus.
The usual syntactic approach to deJning the meaning of any -calculus is in terms
of reduction rules. To avoid getting too far aJeld here we shall instead view -terms
as denoting Chu transforms parametrized by choice of Chu spaces over some Jxed
alphabet  interpreting the ground types. For example, given an interpretation of ground
type P as a Chu space A, a :P:a :P is the identity function 1A on A. Technically
speaking such an interpretation of a -term is a natural transformation (more precisely
dinatural), but we defer that point of view to the next section since the idea of a
parametrized function is natural enough in its own right when represented as a typed
-term.
We interpret system S2 in the linear dialectic -calculus as follows. The ith atomic
implication in an instantiation of axiom T has one of four forms interpreted as
follows:
(i) Pi(Pi as ai :Pi:ai :Pi;
(ii) P⊥i ◦−P⊥i as ai ··P⊥i :ai ··P⊥i ;
(iii) Pi ◦−Pi as xi ··Pi:xi ··Pi; and
(iv) P⊥i (P
⊥
i as xi :P
⊥
i : xi :P
⊥
i .
These constitute the four ways of typing the identity function 1Pi on Pi, which we
construe as either a ground type or if Pi is a negative literal then the negation of
ground type. All four types are necessary if one wishes to be able to interpret every
theorem of S2 in this way.
Interpret T itself as consisting of those n identity functions, associated into pairs of
pairs however the conjunctions are associated. For example, the instance (P(P)⊗
((Q⊥◦−Q⊥)⊗ (R⊥(R⊥)) of T is interpreted as (1P :P(P; (1Q :Q⊥ ◦−Q⊥; 1R :R⊥
(R⊥)).
With this interpretation of the axiom instance as the starting point, interpret succes-
sive theorems in a proof by applying the following transformations, each associated
with the correspondingly labeled inference rule of S2. In the derivation AB via rule
R, the transformation associated by Table 3 to rule R maps the -term interpreting A
to that interpreting B.
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Rules E1–E3 assume that AA′ is realized by (f;f′) :A(A′ and BB′ by (g; g′) :
B(B′.
Rule A1 transforms evidence ((a; b); c) for (A⊗B)⊗C to (a; (b; c)) as evidence for
A⊗ (B⊗C). Rule A2 maps the function f witnessing (A⊗B)(C to the function
a:b:f(a; b) witnessing A( (B(C).
Rule A2′ maps witness f for (A(B) ◦−C to a:y:f(a; y) which given evidence a
for A and y against B, constituting evidence against A(B, produces evidence f(a; y)
against C.
The remaining rules are interpreted along the same lines.
Theorem 4. Every theorem of S2 is interpreted by Table 3 as a transformation rep-
resented by a closed term of the linear dialectic -calculus.
Proof. This is a straightforward consequence of the form of Table 3. The interpretations
of the axiom instances and the rules are in the language, contain no free variables, -
bind exactly one variable, and are typed compatibly with the rules. Free variables in
A; B; C remain free after transformation, by the requirement that all -bound variables
are distinct. The theorem then follows by induction on the length of ..
It is a nice question to characterize those terms of the linear dialectic -calculus for
which the converse holds: every closed term of the linear dialectic -calculus meeting
that characterization interprets some theorem. Taking this a step further, a calculus with
reduction rules should permit a notion of normal form permitting a strenthening of the
above theorem to a bijection between certain terms in normal form and cut-free proofs.
3.8. Transformational semantics
The dialectic -calculus has provided a syntactic connection with Chu spaces by
depending on its mixture of points and states as positive and negative evidence, and
moreover has furnished us with a potentially useful library of transformations of Chu
spaces, namely those deJned by Table 3.
The trouble with such syntactically deJned classes of transformations is that it is easy
to imagine extending the class by extending the language with whatever operations we
might have overlooked. The intrinsic interest in the class would be more compelling
if it had a language-independent deJnition, such that the operations of our language
constituted a complete basis for that class, as with conjunction, negation, and the
constant 0 for the class of Boolean operations.
The appropriate semantic notion is naturality, in which the interpretation of a proof
of A as an element of the interpretation of A is required to remain “constant” as the
latter varies in response to variations in the atoms of A. For example a :A:a :A is in
an intuitive sense “constantly” the identity function, yet its domain and codomain must
necessarily track A as it ranges over di=erent sets, groups, or whatever category we
are working in.
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Naturality is formalized by interpreting terms A; B as functors FA; FB :D→C from a
category D of values for variables appearing in terms to a category C of values for
terms (where D will for us be Cn where n is the number of variables), and entailments
AB as natural transformations 0 :FA→FB. A transformation is a “variable morphism”
varying over D, deJned as a family of morphisms 0x :FA(a)→FB(a) of C indexed by
objects a of D.
A transformation is natural when for all morphisms f : a→ b of D, the diagram on































This basic notion of naturality is only deJned for terms that are (covariantly) func-
torial in their variables, i.e. for variables all of whose occurrences have the same sign.
(In linear logic a variable P all of whose occurrences are negative may be replaced
by a negated variable Q⊥; the new variable Q then occurs only positively and the
resulting formula is no less general.) The diagram on the right generalizes naturality
to the case of mixed variance, where the same variable may occur both positively and
negatively, as in the entailment A(AA⊥(A⊥. Here F(a′; a) separates the negative
occurrences a′ from the positive occurrences a. When this diagram commutes for all
morphisms f : a→ b of D 0 is called dinatural.
Elsewhere [30] we have shown that the dinatural transformations between functors
in Chu built up with tensor and perp soundly interpret MLL in that every cut-free
MLL proof has a distinct interpretation as a dinatural transformation. We showed fur-
thermore that for binary MLL, that fragment of MLL having one positive and one
negative occurrence of each variable, dinatural transformations are a complete inter-
pretation in that every dinatural transformation interprets some cut-free proof. Here we
show that the latter result does not extend to formulas containing four occurrences of a
variable.
Theorem 5. Both big Chu(Set; 2) and little chu(Set; 2) contain spurious dinaturals on
A(A; in the sense that such dinaturals correspond to no MLL proof of (A(A)(
(A(A).
Proof. Ideally there would be one proof for both big and little Chu, using biexten-
sional spaces for the counterexample but without depending on biextensionality in the
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argument. Unfortunately we have not found such a proof and have di=erent proofs for
each case. We begin with big Chu.
Call a Chu space inconsistent when it has no states, and consistent otherwise. Let
0 : I( I be the transformation that, at each inconsistent space A, is the functional on
A(A taking f :A(A to the identity function, and to f otherwise. Such a 0 is not
among the transformations corresponding to MLL proof nets and is therefore spurious.
Its dinaturality is easily veriJed for A;B both consistent or both inconsistent. (When
both are inconsistent, so is A(A, and furthermore the Chu transforms constituting
the points of A(A are all functions on the carrier A.)
When A is inconsistent and B is consistent there are no test morphisms from A
to B to witness failure of dinaturality.
When A is consistent and B is inconsistent, B(A has no points while A(B has
no states, whence there is a unique Chu morphism from B(A to A(B, forcing
the dinaturality diagram to commute. Hence 0 is dinatural.
We now prove the corresponding theorem for little chu. The analogue of the incon-
sistent spaces for this case will be those biextensional Chu spaces which contain both
a row of all zeros and a column of all zeros. Call these the Type I spaces, and the
rest the Type II spaces.
Claim. A(A is Type I if and only if A is.
(If) We need to show that A(A has both a zero row, namely a constantly zero
function, and zero column, namely a pair (a; x) in A×X at which every function is
zero. The former is representable because A (in its role as target of A(A) has a
constantly zero row, and is continuous because A in the role of source has a constantly
zero column. The latter follows by taking a to be the point indexing A’s zero row,
and x the state indexing its zero column.
(Only if ) If A(A is of Type I then it has a zero row, i.e.a zero function, possible
only if A as source has a zero column and as target a zero row. Hence A must also
be Type I.
We now deJne the transformation 0A at Type I spaces A to be the constantly zero
function on A→A, and at all other Chu spaces the identity function on A→A, both
easily seen to be continuous by the above claim. This 0 is spurious, again because it
corresponds to no MLL proof net.
For dinaturality, observe that the dinaturality hexagon commutes for any pair A;B
of Chu spaces of the same type and for any Chu transform f :A→B. For A;B of
Type I this is because going round the hexagon either way yields the zero row. For
Type II it is because f commutes with identities.
When A and B are of opposite types, one of the two homsets Hom(A;B) or
Hom(B;A) must be empty, the former when A lacks a zero column or B lacks a
zero row, the latter when it is B that lacks the zero column or A that lacks the
zero row. If Hom(A;B) is empty then there can be no hexagon because there is no
f :A→B. If Hom(B;A) is empty then the hexagon commutes vacuously, its starting
object being empty. We have thus shown that 0 is dinatural.
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We conclude that dinaturality semantics is too weak for full completeness of Chu
semantics in MLL. This weakness of dinaturality has already been observed in other
contexts, e.g. Set as a model of intuitionistic logic where A→AA→A also has
spurious dinaturals as pointed out by ParVe and RomVan [25]. Constructive intuitionistic
logic has as the proofs from A→A (the set of all functions on the set A) to itself just
the Church numerals, those functions sending f :A→A to fn :A→A for some Jxed
natural number n independent of A. However the spurious transformation sending f
in A→A to f|A|!! can be seen to be dinatural in the category FinSet of Jnite sets,
though not in the category Pos of posets.
A stronger criterion than dinaturality is invariance under logical relations [26] instead
of just morphisms. In collaboration with Devarajan, Hughes, and Plotkin we have shown
full completeness of MLL for binary logical transformations over Chu spaces.
4. Relationship of Chu spaces to mathematics
4.1. Relational structures
A relational structure of a given similarity type or signature (m; n; )) is an
m-tuple of sets A1; A2; : : : ; Am together with an n-tuple of relations R1; : : : ; Rn where
each Rj ⊆ A)( j; 1)×A)( j; 2)× · · · × A)( j; 3( j)) is a subset of 3(j) Ai’s determined by
). These are the models standardly used in Jrst order logic, typically with m=1, the
homogeneous case. A homomorphism between two structures A;A′ with the same
signature is an m-tuple of functions fi :Ai→A′i such that for each 16 j 6 n and for
each (a1; : : : ; a3( j))∈Rj of A, (f(a1); : : : ; f(a3( j)))∈R′j . The class of relational struc-
tures having a given signature together with the class of homomorphisms between them
form a category.
There is no loss of generality in restricting to homogeneous (singlesorted) structures
because the carriers of a heterogeneous structure may be combined with disjoint union
to form a single carrier. The original sorts can be kept track of by adding a new unary
predicate for each sort which is true just of the members of that sort. This ensures that
homomorphisms remain type-respecting.
There is also no loss of generality in restricting to a single relation since the structural
e=ect of any family of nonempty relations can be realized by the natural join of those
relations, of arity the sum of the arities of the constituent relations. A tuple of the
composite relation can then be viewed as the concatenation of tuples of the constituent
relations. The composite relation consists of those tuples each subtuple of which is a
tuple of the corresponding constituent relation.
This reduces our representation problem for relational structures to that of Jnding a
Chu space to represent the structure (A; R) where R ⊆ An for some ordinal n. The class
Strn of all such n-ary relational structures (A; R) is made a category by taking as its
morphisms all homomorphisms between pairs (A; R); (A′; R′) of such structures, deJned
as those functions f :A→A′ such that for all (a1; : : : ; an)∈R, (f(a1); : : : ; f(an))∈R′.
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Every category whose objects are (representable as) n-ary relational structures and
whose morphisms are all homomorphisms between them is a full subcategory of Strn.
For example, the category of groups and group homomorphisms is a full subcategory
of theoremStr3, since groups are fully and faithfully represented by the ternary relation
ab= c.
We represent (A; R) as the Chu space (A; r; X ) over 2n (subsets of n={0; 1; : : : ; n−1})
where (i) X ⊆ (2A)n∼=(2n)A consists of those n-tuples (x1; : : : ; xn) of subsets of A such
that every (a1; : : : ; an)∈R is incident on (x1; : : : ; xn) in the sense that there exists i for
which ai ∈ xi; and (ii) r(a; x)= {i | a∈ xi}.
This representation is concrete in the sense that the representing Chu space has the
same carrier as the structure it represents.
Theorem 6. A function f :A→B is a homomorphism between (A; R) and (B; S) if and
only if it is a continuous function between the respective representing Chu spaces
(A; r; X ) to (B; s; Y ).
Proof. (→) For a contradiction let f :A→B be a homomorphism which is not continu-
ous. Then there must exist a state (y1; : : : ; yn) of B for which f−1(y1); : : : ; f−1(yn)) is
not a state of A. Hence there exists (a1; : : : ; an)∈R for which ai =∈f−1(yi) for every i.
But then f(ai) =∈yi for every i, whence (f(a1); : : : ; f(an)) =∈ S, impossible because f
is a homomorphism.
(←) Suppose f is continuous. Given (a1; : : : ; an)∈R we shall show that (f(a1); : : : ;
f(an))∈ S. For if not then ({f(a1)}; : : : ; {f(an)}) is a state of B. Then by continuity,
(f−1({f(a1)}); : : : ; f−1({f(an)})) is a state ofA. Hence for some i; ai∈f−1({f(ai)}),
i.e. f(ai)∈{f(ai)}, which is impossible.
As an example, groups as algebraic structures determined by a carrier and a binary
operation can also be understood as ternary relational structures. Hence groups can be
represented as Chu spaces over 8 (subsets of {0; 1; 2}) as above, with the continuous
functions between the representing Chu spaces being exactly the group homomorphisms
between the groups they represent.
The above theorem can be restated in categorical language as follows. Any full sub-
category C of the category of n-ary relational structures and their homomorphisms em-
beds fully and concretely in Chu(Set; 2n). That is, there exists a full and faithful functor
F :C→Chu(Set; 2n) such that FU =U ′F where U :C→Set and U ′ :Chu(Set; 2n) are
the respective forgetful functors.
4.2. Topological relational structures
A natural generalization of this representation is to topological relational structures
(A; R; O), where R⊆An and O⊆ 2A is a set of subsets of A constituting the open sets
of a topology on A. (R itself may or may not be continuous with respect to O in some
sense, but this is immaterial here.)
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Such a structure has a straightforward representation as a Chu space over 2n+1,
as follows. Take X =X ′×O where X ′⊆ (2A)n is the set of states on A determined
by R as in the previous subsection. Hence X ⊆ (2A)n+1. With this new representation
the continuous functions will remain homomorphisms with respect to R, but in
addition they will be continuous in the ordinary sense of topology with respect to
the topology O.
For example, topological groups can be represented as Chu spaces over 16.
This is an instance of a more general technique for combining two structures on
a given set A. Let (A; r; X1) and (A; s; X2) be Chu spaces over 1; 2, respectively,
having carrier A in common. Then (A; t; X1×X2) is a Chu space over 1×2, where
t(a; (x1; x2))= (r(a; x1); s(a; x2)).
If now (A′; t′; X ′1 ×X ′2) is formed from (A′; r′; X ′1) over 1 and (A′; s′; X ′2) over
2, then f :A→A′ is a continuous function from (A; t; X1×X2) to (A′; t′; X ′1 ×X ′2)
if and only if it is continuous from (A; r; X1) to (A′; r′; X ′1) and also from (A; s; X2)
to (A′; s′; X ′2). For if (f; g1) and (f; g2) are the latter two Chu transforms, with
g1 :X ′1→X1 and g2 :X ′2→X2, then the requisite g :X ′1 ×X ′2→X1×X2 making (f; g)
an adjoint pair is simply g(x1; x2)= (g1(x1); g2(x2)). The adjointness condition is then
immediate.
4.3. Concretely embedding small categories
The category of n-ary relational structures and their homomorphisms is a very uni-
formly deJned concrete category. It is reasonable to ask whether the objects of less
uniformly deJned concrete categories can be represented as Chu spaces. The surprising
answer is that Chu(Set; ) fully and concretely embeds every concrete category C of
cardinality (total number of elements of all objects, which are assumed disjoint) at most
that of , no matter how arbitrary its construction, save for one small requirement, that
objects with empty underlying set be initial in C.
We begin with a weaker embedding theorem not involving concreteness which in
e=ect combines the two Yoneda embeddings, namely the embedding of C into SetC
◦
and of C◦ into SetC . The di=erence is that whereas these two targets of the Yoneda
embeddings depend nontrivially on the structure of C, that of our embedding depends
only on the cardinality |C|, the number of arrows of C.
This theorem shows o= to best e=ect the relationship between Chu structure and
category structure, being symmetric with respect to points and states. The stronger
concrete embedding that follows modiJes this proof only slightly but enough to break
the appealing symmetry.
Theorem 7. Every small category C embeds fully in Chu(Set; |C|).
Proof. DeJne the functor F :C→Chu(Set; |C|) as F(b)= (A; r; X ) where A= {f : a→
b | a∈ ob(C)}; X = {h : b→ c | c∈ ob(C)}, and r(f; h)= hf=f; h, the converse of
composition. That is, the points of this space are all arrows into b, its states are all
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arrows out of b, and the matrix entries f; h are all composites a
f→ b h→ c of inbound
arrows with outbound.
(A; r; X ) is separable because X includes the identity morphism 1b, for which we have
s(f; 1b)=f; 1b =f, whence f =f′ implies s(f; 1b) = s(f′; 1b). Likewise A includes
1b and the dual argument shows that (A; r; X ) is extensional.
For morphisms take F(g : b→ b′) to be the pair (’;  ) of functions ’ :A→A′;  :X ′
→X deJned by ’(f)=f; g;  (h)= g; h. This is a Chu transform because the adjoint-
ness condition ’(f); h=f;  (h) for all f∈A; h∈X ′ has f; g; h on both sides. In fact
the condition expresses associativity and no more.
To see that F is faithful consider g; g′ : b→ b′. Let F(g)= (’;  ); F(g′)= (’′;  ′).
If F(g)=F(g′) then g=1b; g=’(1b)=’′(1b)= 1b; g′= g′.
For fullness, let (’;  ) be any Chu transform from F(b) to F(b′). We
claim that (’;  ) is the image under F of ’(1b). For let F(’(1b))= (’′;  ′). Then
’′(f)=f;’(1b)=f;’(1b); 1b′ =f; 1b;  (1b′)=f;  (1b′)=’(f), whence ’′=’.
Dually  ′= .
Comparing this embedding with the covariant Yoneda embedding of C in SetC
◦
,
we observe that the latter realizes ’g directly while deferring  g via the machin-
ery of natural transformations. The contravariant embedding, of C in (SetC)◦ (i.e.
of C◦ in SetC) is just the dual of this, realizing  g directly and deferring ’g. Our
embedding in Chu avoids functor categories altogether by realizing both
simultaneously.
The adjointness condition can be more succinctly expressed as the dinaturality in b of
composition mabc :C(a; b)×C(b; c)→C(a; c). The absence of b from C(a; c) collapses
the three nodes of the right half of the dinaturality hexagon to one, shrinking it to the
square








C(a; b′)× C(b′; c) mab′c−→ C(a; c)
Here 1×  g abbreviates C(a; b)×C(g; c) and ’g× 1 abbreviates C(a; g)×C(b′; c).
Commutativity of the square asserts ’g(f); h=f;  g(h) for all f : a→ b and h : b′→ c.
By letting a and c range over all objects of C we extend this equation to the full force
of the adjointness condition for the Chu transform representing g.
This embedding is concrete with respect to the forgetful functor which takes the
underlying set of b to consist of the arrows to b. From that perspective it is a special
case of the following, which allows the forgetful functor to be almost arbitrary. The
one restriction we impose is that objects of C with empty underlying set be initial.
When this condition is met we say that C is honestly concrete.
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Here the alphabet  is the disjoint union of the underlying sets of the objects of C. In
the previous theorem the underlying sets were disjoint by construction and theirunion
consisted simply of all the arrows of C. Now it consists of all the elements of C
marked by object of origin.
Proof. Without loss of generality assume that the underlying sets of distinct objects
of C are disjoint. Then we can view  as simply the set of all elements of objects of
C. Modify F(b)= (A; r; X ) in the proof of the preceding theorem by taking A=U (b)
instead of the set of arrows to b. When U (b) = ∅ take X as before, otherwise take
it to be just {1b}. Lastly take r(f; h)=U (h)(f) where f∈U (b), i.e. application of
concrete U (h) to f instead of composition of abstract h with f. (We stick to the name
f, even though it is no longer a function but an element, to reduce the di=erences
from the previous proof to a minimum.)
(A; r; X ) is separable for the same reason as before. For extensionality there are
three cases. When U (b)= ∅ we forced extensionality by taking X to be a singleton.
Otherwise, for h = h′ : b→ c, i.e. having the same codomain, U faithful implies that
U (h) and U (h′) di=er at some f∈U (b). Finally, for h : b→ c; h′ : b→ c′ where c = c′,
any f∈U (b) suQces to distinguish U (h)(f) from U (h′)(f) since U (c) and U (c′)
are disjoint.
For morphisms take F(g : b→ b′) to be the pair (’;  ) of functions ’ :A→A′;  :X ′
→X deJned by ’(f)=U (g)(f);  (h)=U (hg). This is a Chu transform because the
adjointness condition U (h)(’(f))=U ( (h))(f) for all f∈A; h∈X ′ has U (hg)(f)
on both sides.
This choice of ’ makes ’=U (g), whence F is faithful simply because U is.
For fullness, let (’;  ) be any Chu transform from F(b) to F(b′). We break this
into two cases.
(i) U (b) empty. In this case there is only one Chu transform from F(b) to F(b′),
and by honesty there is one from b to b′, ensuring fullness.
(ii) U (b) nonempty. We claim that  (1b′) is a morphism g : b→ b′, and that F(g)=
(’;  ). For the former,  (1b′) is a state of F(b) and hence a map from b. Let
f∈U (b). By adjointness U (1b′)(’(f))=U ( (1b′))(f) but the left hand side is
an element of U (b′) whence  (1b′) must be a morphism to b′.
Now let F( (1b′))= (’′;  ′). Then for all f∈U (b); U ( ′(h))(f)=U (h◦ (1b′))(f)
=U (h)(U ( (1b′))(f))=U (h)(U (1b′)(’(f)))=U (h)(’(f))=U ( (h))(f). Hence
U ( ′(h))=U ( (h)). Since U is faithful,  ′(h)=  (h). Hence  ′=  . Since F(b) is
separable, ’′=’.
4.4. Homomorphism= continuous, generalized
Theorem 6 identiJed homomorphisms between relational structures with continuous
functions between their respective representations as Chu spaces. Here we extend this
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result to arbitrary extensional Chu spaces by deJning a homomorphism of Chu spaces
to be a property-preserving function for a suitably abstract notion of property of a Chu
space.
Fix an alphabet . For any set A we deJne a -preproperty of A, or just preprop-
erty when context determines , to be a subset of A. In particular A constitutes the
identically true preproperty of A, while the empty set is its identically false preprop-
erty. The -preproperties of A form a power set, namely 2
A
, and as such a complete
atomic Boolean algebra, with intersection and union as respectively conjunction and
disjunction.
We refer to the 2-preproperties of A, those for which =2= {0; 1}, as its logical
preproperties. These are just the ordinary Boolean propositions over A construed as
a set of variables, of which there are 22
|A|
. Each proposition is represented by the set
of its satisfying assignments, those assignments of truth values to variables that make
the proposition true, with each assignment being represented by the set of variables
assigned true. Thus if A= {a; b; c} then the preproperty {{a; b}; {a; b; c}} represents
the proposition a∧ b, and can be transliterated directly as the disjunctive normal form
(DNF) proposition (a∧ b∧ [c) ∨ (a∧ b∧ c), having one disjunct per satisfying assign-
ment in which every variable in A occurs exactly once. The logical preproperties of A
constitute the free Boolean algebra 22
A
on A.
All this extends to inJnite A provided we qualify “Boolean algebra” with “complete
atomic” and allow inJnite DNF propositions. This qualiJcation was not needed for
Jnite A because it is vacuous in that case.
Given an arbitrary Chu space A=(A; r; X ) we deJne a property of A to be a pre-
property of A containing every column of A. As such the properties of A form the
principal Jlter generated by the set Xr(X ) of columns of A, which itself is the strongest
property of A, implying all other properties of A and also being the conjunction of
those properties. This Jlter is the power set 2
A−X , and is a sublattice of the Boolean
algebra 2
A
though not a subBoolean algebra of it.
To every function f :A→B we associate a function Vf : 2A → 2B deJned as Vf(Y )=
{g :B→ | gf∈Y} for Y ⊆A. To avoid notational clutter we think of Vf as merely
an extension of f and say that f sends Y to Vf(Y ). A homomorphism of Chu spaces
A=(A; r; X ); B=(B; s; Y ) is a function f :A→B such that Vf( Xr(X ))⊇ Xs(Y ). This is
equivalent to requiring that f send properties of A to properties of B, justifying the
term “homomorphism”. As further clutter control, without loss of generality we restrict
attention in this section to normal Chu spaces, which simpliJes the above condition to
Vf(X )⊆Y .
Theorem 9. A function f :A→B is a homomorphism from A to B if and only if it
is a continuous function from A to B.
Proof. The function f :A→B is a homomorphism if and only if f(X )⊃Y , if and
only if every g :B→ in Y satisJes gf∈X , if and only if f is continuous.
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We may relate this result to Theorem 6 by identifying an n-tuple with the property
whose states are those n-tuples (x1; : : : ; xn) on which that n-tuple is incident.
5. Conclusion
We have exhibited embeddings in Chu of two quite di=erent notions of “general”
category. One is that of relational structures and their homomorphisms, possibly with
topological structure and the requirement that the homomorphisms be continuous. The
other is that of an arbitrary small category, possibly concrete. Both embeddings are
concrete. The Jrst is concrete in the ordinary sense of the representing object (A; r; X )
having as its underlying set A the carrier of the represented relational structure. The
second is concrete with respect to arrows-to as elements, or to the underlying sets of
the objects when these are provided.
Quite a few categories are known that are universal to the extent of fully embedding
all small categories, as well as all algebraic categories. However those embeddings
are highly artiJcial, relying on the ability of such objects as graphs and semigroups
to code the compositional structure of morphisms that compose at an object to be so
represented. Any representation based on clever coding introduces irrelevant complexity
into the mathematics of objects so represented. Furthermore the coding obscures the
ordinary elements of concrete objects, further undermining our intuitions about concrete
objects.
These embeddings provide a sense in which the denotational semantics of linear
logic can be understood to be at least as general as that of Jrst-order logic. This is not
to say that the generality is achieved at the same level. A model of Jrst order logic is
a relational structure, and the models of a given theory form a category. A model of
linear logic on the other hand is the category itself, whose objects are the denotations
of mere formulas.
This is the basic di=erence between Jrst order or elementary logic and linear logic.
First order logic reasons about the interior of a single object, the domain of discourse
being the elements or individuals that exist in that object together with the relationships
that hold between them. Linear logic reasons instead about how things appear on the
outside, understanding the structure of objects externally in terms of how they interact
rather than internally in terms of what they might contain. The fundamental interaction
is taken to be that of transformation of one object into another. Elements and their
relationships are not discussed explicitly, but their existence and nature is inferred from
how the objects containing them interact.
This being the essence of the categorical way of doing mathematics, linear logic so
construed must therefore be the categorical logic of general mathematics. As such
it is sibling to intuitionistic categorical logic, whose domain of discourse is con-
Jned to cartesian closed mathematics, having as its exemplar category Set. The thesis
we have presented here is that the examplar category of general mathematics
is Chu(Set;−).
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